Ukraine and the significance of resistance
John Raine asserts that even though the Russian military may overwhelm the Ukrainians, this will not determine the outcome. It is not about whether Russians can be made pay a visible and tangible cost for territorial expansion, but through effective, well-armed resistance. Although speculation on the outcome of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia may be more valuable than an acknowledgment of what has been achieved, it is not as effective as acknowledging what has actually happened. The United States, Britain, and others warned long ago that the conflict in Ukraine would be a nightmare. But it has happened as expected. It is on a clear trajectory. To stop this trajectory and reverse it, sanctions are not enough. Ukrainian resistance is essential.
We are unperturbed and we keep going!
Putin has proven to be unable to resist nor to follow the strategic logic, which many thought would deter him from carrying out such a major act of aggression. However, his attack on Ukraine is framed in a disturbing narrative of ‘rollingback NATO’. He has aggressively attacked a neighboring state as the first stage in a strategy that aims to expand and restore the Soviet dominium. This raises more questions than the fate of Ukraine’s sovereign.
Putin has plenty of reasons to be proud. He has spent decades modernizing Russian armed forces, reconfiguring them for this type campaign, and then testing and tempering weapons, equipment and personnel in the war in Syria. In Ukraine, his military capabilities will be far lower than those of Russia, as they are largely built on Russian equipment. He has also been assured by the Western nations that there will be no military deployment in Ukraine. He has been repeatedly reminded of the fact that the West, for political reasons will continue to use sanctions as its main response. Putin’s strategic calculations are now based on exclusion and sanctions, having abandoned the ambitions for inclusion and influence within Russia since 2008. Putin can choose his weapons freely, but his opponents only have one that does his job.
Putin, however, isn’t immune to risks.
Putin’s biggest threat is that he underestimated the Ukrainian potential to inflict significant harm on its armed forces by resisting. In the Russian security-community echo-chamber, it is probable that he was briefed on the possibility of a strike, repair, and retirement strategy being used in Ukraine. The plan would allow Ukraine to be destroyed and subordinated by an overwhelming invasion, sufficient to establish a puppet ruler. It does not have to occupied. Putin would be very hurt by a resistance that annihilates Russian forces and would force him to adjust. He might want to withdraw his force before it happens but a strong resistance early on will force him into the country to help a puppet dictatorship. They will then be targets. Putin will avoid any sustained resistance as this will result in them being drawn into conflicts and low-intensity asymmetrical street-tostreet fighting. His firepower advantage is only a small one unless he’s willing to be dragged into another Grozny. He won’t find it easy to manage the consequences of this attack, including human casualties.
The second risk is that Russia becomes a coalition. The coalition is currently based on unprecedented levels, or even zero, unity within NATO and European Union. Russia also has support from smaller, less strategic countries. China holds a major key. Putin will be counting on Xi Jinping not to become complicit but remain neutral. This may hold Xi to a neutral position, but this will not guarantee that it is easy for Putin to do what he does in Ukraine. His priorities are elsewhere. He will not damage his preparations of the 20th Communist Party National Congress in this year which will see him seek his third term. It is risky to have too close a relationship, even with an ex-Russian leader. The diplomatic task of the diplomat is to turn any Chinese anxiety into pressure from East. Putin believes that this is the only way to open the large valve.
Putin runs the risk of losing the initiative in every aspect of his campaign. He has succeeded in maintaining the military initiative, increasing deployments incrementally to suit his own timetable. So far, he has not felt shock or awe nor any material cost. The warnings of the likely consequences that were intended to deter him have instead allowed him to free himself to make the next move, whenever he wishes. It has also reassured him about the possibility of a manageable outcome. There has been one exception: Washington’s savvy use of intelligence has earned them escalation dominance. At least, that is outside Russia. Moscow was forced to the sidelines. This might be the lesson for him: a sudden and sharp move against him in different domains, one not in his usual repertoire, would put him in the uncomfortable and unfamiliar situation of losing the initiative. He will need to adapt, a strength that neither he or his armed forces possess, and will be denied the strategic momentum which he currently enjoys.
But, it is probable that the current momentum of his plan will be sufficient for him to move through the next phases of its political agenda, the taking of power and to the limits of his incursion. It is unlikely that the momentum will be stopped by any international opposition or Ukrainian resistance.
The importance of armed Resistance and the challenges
However, while the Russian military might overwhelm the Ukrainians in numbers, this will not be the decisive factor in this conflict. The issue is whether Russia can be made to bear a visible and tangible cost of territorial expansion by effectively resisting armed forces. A strong Ukrainian resistance is required to overcome NATO’s refusals to deploy troops inside Ukraine. But it will be difficult to support and encourage resistance. This is not easy despite the promises of solidarity and support from Western leaders. The ability to deliver material support will depend on political appetites as well legal parameters. This is a crucial test for the NATO-backed anti-Assad coalition. It failed in Syria. We can learn from Syria the crucial importance of supplying weapons and the dedication required to do so over time. This will require you to invest effort and financial capital in the creation of the required legal and politically based frameworks. It will be harmful for Ukraine’s partners to signal their support if they are not able to deliver. The US-led US-led coalition lost its alliance with Kurdistan and Syria. It now has the opportunity to rebuild its global credibility in partnership with allies fighting asymmetrical conflicts.
Ukraine has more at risk than Syria. If the Ukrainian resistance wins, Putin might be forced to abandon his plans for the restoration the larger Soviet dominion. This could mean that Putin is unable to take power as the last dictator. It is worth investing.